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Unequal Chances on the Transitional Labour Market,
The Case of the Netherlands
Abstract
The emergence of a transitional labour market offers new opportunities to workers, but
at the same time bears the risk of (new) inequalities. This paper deals with unequal
chances on the transitional labour market in the Netherlands, in particular for workers
from the four largest immigrant groups: Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans.
The data used are from the SPVA, the survey ‘Social Position and Use of Public Utilities
by Migrants’ for the years 1998 and 2002. These are based on stock sampling. Since for
some individuals labour market transitions occur at a very low rate, these individuals may
stay in their current state till they reach the retirement age of 65. We estimate hazard rate
models that account for both the stock-sampling and the possible maximum duration for
the transitions from unemployment, household care and disability to employment. Then
we decompose the difference in expected duration between the immigrant groups and
the Dutch into the contribution of differences in observable characteristics, coefficient
estimates and baseline hazard parameters. The main results of the analyses are that
unequal chances exist, but to a different degree for the various groups and with variations
per transition type.
JEL classification: C41, J64, J7.
Key words: Transitional labour market; duration; Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.
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1 Introduction
According to the German economist Gu¨nther Schmid, who is the founding father of the con-
cept of the transitional labour market (TLM), this type of labour market is now emergent in
Western economies (e.g. Schmid 1998, 2000, 2002a,b). This implies that individuals experience
an increasing number of transitions during their working career as a consequence of intertwined
economic and social trends. These transitions concern both the field of paid labour itself, e.g.
transitions from one job to another, and transitions between work and other activities, e.g. fam-
ily care, education, unemployment. The rise of such transitions implies that ‘life-long tenures’
are becoming a characteristic of the past, since today’s workers are much more inconstant and
flexible.
One of the basic assumptions of Schmid’s approach is that the increased worker flexibility
is beneficial to employers who need to adapt to turbulent markets, as well as to employees
who want to bring their working career in line with their private life. Increasing transitions
comprise a risk for employees however, viz. that interruptions of the working career which are
meant to be temporary, unintendedly turn out to be permanent. This applies in particular to
transitions from work to unemployment, education, prolonged illness and household care. For
this reason governments apply policies to stimulate the return to work for those who experience
a break in their working career. Such policies are in accordance with Schmid’s normative con-
cept of the transitional labour market: “... to envisage new kinds of institutional arrangements
to prevent those transitions from becoming gates to social exclusion and to transform them
into a wider range of opportunities for the employed (maintenance transitions) as well as for
the inactive or unemployed people (integrative transitions)” (Schmid 2000:xx). Pro-active poli-
cies, supported by public and private arrangements facilitating labour market transitions, will
favour the efficient operation of the labour market as well as diminish the risks of ’exclusionary
transitions’.
In Schmid’s view, the Netherlands offers a good example in this respect. He favors the
Dutch employment strategy of redistributing work and income on a massive scale, and argues
that e.g. Germany can learn from the modernisation of the Dutch employment service. In
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this connection, he points in particular at the placement service for long-term unemployed,
‘who under normal conditions have virtually no chance of finding employment again’ (Schmid
1997:10). He furthermore attributes the Dutch ‘employment miracle’ of the 1990s to the high
degree of part-time work in newly created jobs (Schmid 2002b:156), to increased flexibilisation
on the labour market (especially as a consequence of the growth of temporary work), and
to the ‘flexicurity’-approach optimising flexibility as well as work security (ibidem 2001:12;
also Wilthagen 1998). Given Schmid’s appreciation of the Dutch situation, it is particularly
interesting to choose the Netherlands as a case to investigate whether the emergence of a
transitional labour market implies new risks of social exclusion.
According to the German sociologist Ullrich Beck increasing risks of social exclusion are a
trade-mark of the modern ‘risk-society’, which means that we can all be the victim of it (Beck
1992). We may nevertheless assume that individuals differ in ‘transitional skills’ in the same
way they differ in e.g. human capital. Not everyone possesses the cognitive and social skills
required for a ‘reflexively organised life planning’ (Giddens 1991). This holds true even when
institutional arrangements of the kind Schmid proposes are available, since individuals differ
in self-activity (Dewey 1990) - also in relation to using public utilities, what has been called
‘institutional self-activity’ (Dieleman and van der Lans 1999).
In the Netherlands Distelbrink and Pels (2002) found that immigrants experience more
problems in relation to such self-activity, partly as a consequence of their upbringing which is
more directed at compliance and respect than at autonomic thinking and acting, and partly
because of their on average lower educational level. We therefore expect immigrants to also
have less ‘transitional skills’ in addition to impediments in other resources that are relevant for
their achievements on the labour market, like human capital, social capital and cultural capital
(Bourdieu 1986). This makes it of interest to compare the transitional risks of immigrants and
Dutch natives. If we add that selection processes on the Dutch labour market also negatively
affect immigrants’ job chances, even when they have identical resources (e.g. Bovenkerk et al.
1995), we believe to have enough arguments to focus on the risks of exclusionary transitions
for immigrants in the Netherlands.
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We therefore formulate the research question as follows: Does the emergent transitional
labour market in the Netherlands imply higher risks of ‘exclusionary’ transitions for immigrants
compared to Dutch natives?
With the exception of the year 1967, the Netherlands is a net-immigration country since
the 1960s. From this time up to the 1990s immigration was dominated by four immigrant
groups, and still the majority, about 70 percent of the immigrants and their descendants, come
from Turkey and Morocco (the Mediterraneans), and from Suriname and the Dutch Antilles
(the Caribbeans). We will therefore focus on these four groups, also because they are the best
documented immigrant groups in the Netherlands.
Since we try to gain insight into exclusionary transitions we will focus on those who are
unemployed or inactive now, to ascertain their chances to find a job (again). For this reason
we are interested in four transition types, viz. from education to work, from unemployment to
work, from domestic care to work, and from prolonged illness (disability to work, to be more
precise) to work. We will systematically compare the transition chances of immigrants and
Dutch natives in these fields.
Hereafter we will first elaborate on Schmid’s approach of the transitional labour market
(section 2). We will then discuss our method and the data used (section 3). The analyses and
their results will be presented in section 4, where each of the four aforementioned transitions
will be elaborated on subsequently. Section 5 will contain our conclusions and a short discussion
of the main findings.
2 The TLM-approach
In recent decades work has become more variable and insecure. There is no guarantee on full
employment and the standard biography (education-work-inactivity for males and education-
work-marriage/care-inactivity for females) increasingly became a feature of the past. Individuals
face transitions in their working career more often. Some of these transitions are voluntarily
from the point of view of the worker. In this sense the standard biography has been replaced
by a biography from choice; today’s citizens have increasing opportunities to arrange their
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lives according to their own needs and preferences. The situation of individual ‘free choice’
has a drawback, however. The new biography, which has been described as a ‘do-it-yourself
biography’, can in some instances become a ‘breakdown biography’ (Beck 1992, Giddens 1991).
Increasing risks therefore are characteristic of today’s labour markets.
Schmid’s concept of the transitional labour market is both empirical and normative. In
the latter sense it is directed at giving advices on new institutional arrangements that should
prevent exclusion from paid work. The empirical TLM-concept concerns the actual increase
in transitions during the working career. The number of labour market transitions has grown
and their nature has changed because of a combination of economic, technological, cultural
and demographic trends that partly coincide. The most relevant economic trend is the growing
need for flexibilisation of labour relations, which is especially caused by insecurity in sales mar-
kets and increased international competition (Schmid 1998, 2002a,b, and for the Netherlands:
Geelhoed 1997). Technological trends also affect the flexibilisation of labour relations, and at
the same time have a more direct effect on the increment of transitions. In this connection one
should particularly think of fast changes in the ICT-sector which were strongly influenced by
globalisation (Schmid 2002a). The most important cultural trends influencing the emergence
of transitional labour markets are the interlinked individualisation and women’s liberation, in
their turn both affected by secularisation. Particularly the fast growing female labour market
participation requires smooth transitions between paid work and domestic work. Demografic
trends that add to the coming of the transitional labour market are population ageing in com-
bination with declining fertility rates. Their consequences in terms of the ratio of economically
inactive and active people in society (the so-called i/a-ratio), call for policies such as the pro-
longation of the working life. To ensure this, extra investments in human capital are needed
during the working career (to diminish the usual deterioration of this capital). Furthermore
one or two rest periods during the working career may be instrumental to motivate workers to
bonding to the labour market until an advanced age. From the above we can infer the necessity
of transitions between paid labour on the one hand and education and sabbaticals on the other.
This short sketch of ‘driving forces’ behind the emergence of a transitional labour market
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leads us to the transition types we are talking about. Gu¨nther Schmid (1998) uses the following
scheme to show which transitions are relevant for his TLM-approach.
[Place Figure 1 about here]
We will deviate somewhat from the scheme by neglecting the transition to and from retire-
ment, since this is still mainly ‘one-way traffic’ and therefore less interesting for our purposes to
elaborate on differences in exclusionary transitions. Instead we will explicitly add the transition
from prolonged illness, in this case the disability to work. The latter is of special interest for
the Netherlands, where in 2004 about 960,000 people received an allowance since they were
officially registered as inable to work (Statistics Netherlands).1
Gu¨nther Schmid advocates the normative TLM-concept because he is convinced that apart
from some advantages, the emergent transitional labour markets bear the risk of social exclusion
and insecurity. He states that many transitions are critical in the sense that they may lead to
downward spirals of job careers (exclusionary transitions), ending in recurrent unemployment
or ultimately in long-term unemployment and poverty (Schmid 2000:93). He uses the metaphor
of a door to indicate the risks of transitions. Risky transitions may be seen as an exit from the
labour market, while it is not at all certain whether there will be an entrance again. Schmid uses
the expression ‘kick off process of social exclusion’ (1998:9) for such circumstances. Opposite to
exclusionary transitions are integrative transitions and maintenance transitions. The first refer
to transitions of those who were initially outside paid labour and enter a job now, while the
second refer to transitions of those who are already in work and have found ways of maintaining
employment by moving between different working-time regimes. The latter must be considered
as an example, because other transitions can also have a maintenance character, like e.g. the
transition from one job to another. Integrative transitions may in our opinion also refer to the
movement of those who are in paid labour and considerably improve their position (e.g. by
going from an irregular job to a regular job).
1Recently several measures were taken to diminish the number of those who are disabled to work. The
positive results show from the decline in 2005 to about 880,000 people. To put this number in perspective, we
add that the employed labour force then counted about 6,9 million people.
5
Given the aforementioned economic, technological and social trends, the core question within
Schmid’s TLM-approach is not whether or not transitions will increase, but how they will affect
the worker position. Are workers able to maintain or even improve their position, or will they
be the victims of unintended social exclusion which may lead to long-lasting unemployment?
Before we answer this question we will first present the data and method used.
3 Data and method
Our data are taken from the nationwide survey ‘Social Position and Use of Public Utilities
by Migrants’, more specifically from the survey’s editions for the years 1998 and 2002.2 The
survey’s main purposes are to gain insight into (the development of) the socio-economic position
of the four largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and
Antilleans), in the variety in socio-economic position among these groups as well as in differences
in position compared to the native Dutch.3 Because of the high degree of spatial concentration
of immigrants in the larger cities, the survey is based on random sampling within the 13 largest
Dutch cities. This procedure results in nationwide representativeness for the four immigrant
groups.4 In each household the head of household was asked to answer general questions on
the composition of the household and (if relevant) on its migration history. All members of the
household being older than 11 years were asked to answer the other questions.5 Both the first
generation of actual immigrants and the second generation (of descendants) are represented in
the survey. Table 1 shows the number of respondents per group.
2 The 1998-survey was done by the Institute for Sociological and Economic Research (ISEO) from Erasmus
University Rotterdam in co-operation with the Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands (SCP). In
2002 ISEO co-operated with the SCP and, on specific items, with researchers from the Netherlands Organisation
for Scientific Research (NWO)-Program Netherlands Kinship Panel Study (NKPS).
3To be considered as a member of one of the immigrant groups, the person or at least one of his parents
should be coming from the country concerned.
4More detailed information on the survey can be found in Groeneveld and Weijers-Martens (2003).
5An exception must be made for a series of questions on cultural integration and social contacts, which are
not relevant for our purposes. These questions were asked alternately in interviews with the head of household
and his/her partner and in interviews with the eldest child present during the interview.
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Table 1: Number of people in SPVA by ethnicity and main activity.
Turks Moroccans Surinamese Antilleans Natives Total
Main activity
Working 2129 1640 2802 1522 2336 10429
Unemployed searching for job 589 500 364 263 128 1844
Domestic care 1328 1164 439 308 402 3641
Disability benefits 552 440 303 116 165 1576
Student 259 304 296 274 152 1289
Other 189 118 100 79 162 648
Total 5046 4166 4304 2562 3345 19423
*Only people 18-65 years. Source: SPVA (ISEO/SCP)
3.1 Duration analysis
The differences in employment rate are reflected in data on the duration of unemployment, the
duration of disability benefits and the duration of domestic care. The data contain retrospective
information on the length of the elapsed duration in the labour market situation at the interview
moment.
The aforementioned data on the duration in a particular state are based on stock sampling,
because they are obtained by sampling from the stock in that state using a single interview.6
Since for some individuals labour market transitions occur at a very low rate, these individuals
may stay in their current state till they reach the retirement age of 65. In the Netherlands, as in
most Western countries, unemployment benefits and disability benefits cease after retirement.
In fact, everybody leaves the (potential) workforce when reaching the retirement age. This
implies that every state has an upper bound of its duration till retirement. We will account for
both the stock-sampling and the possible maximum duration.
In duration analysis the hazard rate or intensity is usually modelled. A common way to
6In fact some individuals are interviewed twice, both in 1998 and in 2002, in the SPVA. However, only for a
very limited number of individuals this occurs. Therefore we ignore the panel structure for these few individuals.
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accommodate the presence of observed characteristics is to specify a proportional intensity
model,
λ(t|x) = λ0(t;α)e
β′xi(t), (1)
where λ0(t;α) represents the baseline hazard, that is, the duration dependence of the intensity
common to all individuals. The covariates affect the intensity proportionally and the time-
varying variables are external variables that change independent of the employment state, such
as the age of a disabled individual that changes independent of the employment state. If the
duration of individual i has an upper bound of t¯i, the time till retirement, the hazard of leaving
unemployment at t¯i is ∞. This implies that the probability to reach t¯i for individual i is
S(t¯i|xi) = exp
(
−
∫ t¯i
0
λ0(s;α)e
β′xi(s) ds
)
.
If we sample from a stock of individuals at time 0 (in calendar time) in a particular state,
e.g. from the stock of people on disability benefits, and observe the elapsed time e in that
state, then the distribution of the observations e is a conditional distribution, see a.o. Heckman
and Singer (1984). The condition is the presence of a particular individual in the stock. Let
r(−e|xi) denote the entry rate, the probability to enter the state during [e, e+ de) in the past
given observed characteristics x and assume, as Nickell (1979) does, that the entry of people
with characteristics x is a constant fraction of the total entry, r(−e|x) = r1(−e)r2(x) then the
density of the elapsed duration is
h(e|t¯i, xi) =
r1(−e)e
−Λ(e|xi)∫ t¯i
0
r1(−τ)e−Λ(τ |xi) dτ
(2)
where Λ(e|xi) =
∫ e
0
λ0(s;α) exp
(
β ′xi(s)
)
ds, the integrated hazard.
In practice it is hard to find a closed form solution to the integrals in the density. For
example, the commonly applied proportional hazard model with Weibull baseline hazard leads
to intractable integrals. Although these integrals may be approximated, the Weibull baseline
is also very restrictive. A very flexible and tractable assumption is to use a piecewise constant
baseline hazard. If the entry rate is also constant on intervals we have a closed form expression
for the density of the elapsed duration, from which we can easily derive a maximum likelihood
estimator for the parameters of the model. This boils down to assuming the baseline hazard
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is constant on M intervals. Let the intervals Im(t) = I(dm−1 ≤ t < dm) for m = 0, . . . ,M
with d0 = 0 and dM = maxi{t¯i} be the intervals on which we define the baseline hazard. Then
the baseline hazard is λ0(t;α) =
∑M
m=0 e
αmIm(t). When the covariates may only change on the
same intervals the integrated hazard is7
Λ(t|x) =
M∑
m=1
[
Jm(t)(dm − dm−1) + Im(t)(t− dm−1)
]
exp(αm−1 + x(dm−1)β)
where Jm(t) = I(t > tm). If we assume that the entry rate r1(−e) is also constant on intervals
the integral can be written in closed form.
A well known issue in duration models is that neglecting unobserved heterogeneity in pro-
portional hazards models leads to spurious negative duration dependence. In principle it is
possible to allow for possible unobserved heterogeneity in our model through a multiplicative
random error term in the hazard, λ(t|x, v) = vλ0(t;α)e
β′xi(t). Murphy (1996) shows how to
include Gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity into the stock-sampled proportional haz-
ards model. The adjustment to a possible upper bound on the duration is rather straightforward,
as is the use of a discrete unobserved heterogeneity distribution. We attempted to fit models
with a gamma or with a discrete unobserved heterogeneity distribution. However, none of these
models have led to an indication of unobserved heterogeneity or a change in the parameters
and, therefore, we do not present the details of the models with unobserved heterogeneity.
3.2 Decomposition of the difference in expected duration
The standard wage decomposition methodology of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) has been
widely used to examine discrimination in the labour market. The technique decomposes the
average difference in wages between two demographic groups into differences in observable
characteristics ( differences that the variables in the regression model can explain, mainly
endowments), and differences in coefficient estimates ( the structure of the model that cannot
be explained).
7This is for notational convenience. If either the covariates or the entry rate or both changes at different
points, we can just add additional change points.
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Suppose we distinguish two groups g = 1, 2 and observe for each group i = 1, . . . , Ng
individuals. Consider the following linear regression model, which is estimated separately for
each group
Yig = Xigβg + ǫig (3)
For such a linear model, the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the average value of
the dependent variable is
Y¯1 − Y¯2 =
[
E[Yi1|Xi1, βˆ1]− E[Yi1|Xi1, βˆ1]
]
(4)
+
[
E[Yi2|Xi2, βˆ1]− E[Yi2|Xi2, βˆ2]
]
= (X¯1 − X¯2)βˆ1 + X¯2(βˆ1 − βˆ2)
where Y¯g = N
−1
g
∑Ng
i=1 Yig and X¯g = N
−1
g
∑Ng
i=1Xig. E[Yig|Xig, βˆg] refers to the conditional
expectation of Yig evaluated at the (OLS) estimated parameter vector βˆg. The first term on
the right hand side of (4) represents the difference in the outcome variable between the groups
due to differences in observable characteristics and the second term represents the differential
due to differences in coefficient estimates. The second term also captures the portion of the
differential due to group differences in unmeasurable characteristics.
However, in most models for duration outcomes the expectation is a non-linear function of
the coefficients β and ancillary parameters α reflecting the shape of the baseline hazard. Addi-
tionally, duration data are usually censored and OLS estimation leads to biased estimation of
the parameter vector and hence to misleading results of the decomposition. Let E(Xi, β, α) de-
note the expected duration for the individual with characteristics Xi given the coefficient vector
β and the baseline hazard parameter vector α. Then, following Fairlie (2006), the decomposition
of the non-linear difference in expected duration Y¯1 − Y¯2 can be written as
D1 =
[
N1∑
i=1
E(Xi1, βˆ1, αˆ1)
N1
−
N2∑
i=1
E(Xi2, βˆ1, αˆ1)
N2
]
+
[
N2∑
i=1
E(Xi2, βˆ1, αˆ1)
N2
−
N2∑
i=1
E(Xi2, βˆ1, αˆ2)
N2
]
(5)
+
[
N2∑
i=1
E(Xi2, βˆ1, αˆ2)
N2
−
N2∑
i=1
E(Xi2, βˆ2, αˆ2)
N2
]
10
The first term in brackets on the right hand side reflects the contribution of the characteristics,
the second term in brackets reflects the contribution of the baseline hazard and the last term in
brackets reflects the contribution of the coefficients to the difference in expected duration. Note
that the decomposition also depends on the shape parameter(s), α. Consequently, there are
three other equivalent possible decompositions of the difference in expected duration between
the two groups on which αg is used in the counterfactual parts of the decomposition equation.
D2 = D
(
X1, 1, 1, X2, 1, 1
)
+D
(
X2, 2, 1, X2, 2, 2
)
+D
(
X2, 1, 1, X2, 2, 1
)
D3 = D
(
X1, 2, 2, X2, 2, 2
)
+D
(
X1, 1, 1, X1, 1, 2
)
+D
(
X1, 1, 2, X1, 2, 2
)
D4 = D
(
X1, 2, 2, X2, 2, 2
)
+D
(
X1, 2, 1, X1, 2, 2
)
+D
(
X1, 1, 1, X1, 2, 1
)
where
D
(
Xm, b
1, a1, Xn, b
2, a2
)
=
Nm∑
i=1
E(Xim, βˆb1 , αˆa1)
Nm
−
Nn∑
i=1
E(Xin, βˆb2, αˆa2)
Nn
The alternative methods of calculating the decomposition provide different estimates, which is
the familiar index problem with the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. Ham et al. (1998) suggest
to average over the alternative decompositions to estimate the contribution of the coefficient es-
timates and of the coefficients. They did not consider the difference in the baseline hazard. Thus
including the ancillary parameters, we propose to measure the contribution of the difference in
the duration between the groups due to differences in observable characteristics by
D(X) =
1
2
2∑
k=1
D
(
X1, k, k,X2, k, k
)
(6)
The contribution of the coefficient estimates to the differential is measured by
D(β) =
1
4
2∑
g=1
[
D
(
Xg, 1, 2, Xg, 2, 2
)
+D
(
Xg, 1, 1, Xg, 2, 1
)]
(7)
The contribution of the baseline hazard to the differential is measured by
D(α) =
1
4
2∑
g=1
[
D
(
Xg, 2, 1, Xg, 2, 2
)
+D
(
Xg, 1, 1, Xg, 1, 2
)]
(8)
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Note that D(X) +D(β) +D(α) = D
(
X1, 1, 1, X2, 2, 2
)
= Y¯1 − Y¯2, as should be. However, this
holds only for uncensored data. For censored (and also for stock sampled data) the average
observed duration is not equal to the true underlying expected duration. With stock sampled
data the average observed elapsed duration is (see Heckman and Singer (1984))
E[e] = 1
2
µ
(
1 +
σ2
µ2
)
with µ and σ2 as true expected duration and true variance of duration respectively. These two
moments of the true durations cannot be observed and, therefore, we decompose the expected
durations implied by the model, say the proportional hazards model in section 3.1, instead of
the observed mean durations.
4 Differential transitional risks
In this section we will try to answer the research question whether the emergent transitional
labour market in the Netherlands implies higher risks of ‘exclusionary’ transitions for immi-
grants than for Dutch natives. As stated before we will subsequently focus on four transition
types: from education, unemployment, domestic care and prolonged illness (disability to work)
to paid work.
4.1 From education to work
Career breaks due to a transition from work to full-time education are rare (see de Koning
et al. 2003 for the Netherlands). Because of this hardly any information is available on such
transitions. We will therefore focus on youngsters’ transition from full-time education to work.
However, since we lack data on the duration of unemployment among school leavers, we are
not able to use duration analysis. Being rather ‘critical’, the transition from school to work
will nonetheless not remain unspoken. We have to rely on ‘stylized facts’ though. From these
we learn that the transition is problematic for Turkish and Moroccan youngsters, even more
than for Surinamese and Antillean youngsters (Roelandt and Veenman 1990). An important
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causal factor is that many Turkish and Moroccan youngsters leave school without a diploma.
Especially for these ‘drop outs’ the transition to work is very difficult.
Using the SPVA-1998 Dagevos (2001) investigated the transition from school to work for
those with a secondary vocational education, on the assumption that the immigrant youth who
finished this education were brought up in the Netherlands and master the Dutch language.
But even in these conditions and with a diploma that is considered to offer good opportunities
on the labour market, immigrant youth appear to have less job chances than native Dutch
contemporaries with the same education. In contrast to the native Dutch reference category,
Turkish and Moroccan school leavers on this educational level are often unemployed for some
time. In this respect Surinamese and Antillean school leavers with a secondary vocational
education are in-between the Turkish and Moroccan youth on the one hand and the native
Dutch youth on the other. Dagevos emphasises that these outcomes remain unchanged even
when school leavers with the same educational profile are compared to each other: Turkish and
Moroccan youngsters are more often and longer unemployed, and Surinamese and Antillean
youngsters too have a significantly higher unemployment rate and a longer employment duration
than native Dutch youngsters.
The latest edition of the SPVA (SPVA-2002) shows high unemployment figures for immi-
grant youth, this time for Caribbean youth (Surinamese and Antillean) in particular. Their
unemployment rate is almost five times as high as the rate for native Dutch youth. The unem-
ployment rate for Mediterranean youth (Turks and Moroccans) is about three times as high as
the rate for native Dutch youth. From these data we may infer that the transition from school
to work is still problematic for immigrant youngsters. This expectation is confirmed when we
compare the unemployment rates of those with an identical educational level. This rate is much
higher among immigrant youth. Among school leavers without a diploma (the ‘drop outs’)
about two-thirds of both the Mediterranean and the Caribbean youngsters are unemployed or
have a job for less than 12 hours per week. Among native Dutch ’drop outs’ this figure is less
than 30%. Among school leavers with a diploma of a primary vocational education 45% of
the Caribbean youngsters, 35% of the Mediterranean youngsters and 17% of the native Dutch
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youngsters are unemployed or work less than 12 hours per week. On the secondary educational
the percentage among immigrant youth is 27 and among native Dutch youth 10.8
The aforementioned results all point in the direction of higher transitional risks for immi-
grants. The conclusion holds for all four immigrant groups. The on average lower educational
level and the higher proportion of ‘drop outs’ partly explain the findings. However, immigrant
youth with an identical educational level still have higher transitional risks than native Dutch
youth. Veenman (1998) found that a combination of factors attribute to the explanation of this
phenomenon: lower language proficiency, less knowledge of the labour market, less useful social
contacts, another attitude towards work, as well as selection processes on the labour market
which are detrimental to immigrants.
4.2 From unemployment to work
The unemployment among immigrant groups as ‘officially’ registered by the Employment Office
is four till five times as high as among Dutch natives, with the most disadvantageous figures
for the Mediterraneans.9 These differences in employment rate are reflected in data on the un-
employment duration. Looking at the ‘registered’ unemployment again, we find that the Turks
have, on average, the longest duration, followed by (in this order) Antilleans, Moroccans and
Surinamese.10 The relatively favourable position of Moroccans is caused by the labour market
withdrawal of women in case their unemployment lasts more than a few months. Focusing on
males only, we find that Moroccans have on average the longest unemployment duration after
the Turks.
The described data on the unemployment duration are based on stock sampling which
leads to a distortion as a consequence of ‘length biased sampling’. In section 3.1 a correction
8On the level of higher vocational education and universities the numbers of immigrant school leavers are
too small to formulate reliable statements.
9The ‘registered’ unemployment figures are: Dutch natives 2%, Surinamese: 7%, Antilleans 8%, Moroccans
9% and Turks 10%. (source: SPVA-2002 and survey Labour Force 2002).
10To illustrate this: among unemployed Turks almost 40% is jobless for at least two years. For Moroccans the
same figure is 30%, among Antilleans 28% and among Surinamese 20%.
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for this distortion is discussed. We also account for the possibility that some individuals stay
unemployed till they reach retirement. With stock sampled data, unemployed from a period
with high unemployment are overrepresented in the data. We adjust for such overrepresentation
by assuming that the national inflow in the unemployment in the past is proportional to the
observed characteristics of the unemployed.11 These inflow figures give the weights r1(−e) in
equation (2). The inclusion of two time-varying covariates, age and presence of young children,
deserve additional explanation. The age of the unemployed at the moment of the interview is
calculated backwards to the age at the moment their unemployment spell begun. The presence
of young children (under twelve) in the household is also calculated backwards through the
information on the age of all the children now present in the household.
For this stock based sample of unemployment durations (in months) we apply a proportional
hazards model with a piecewise constant baseline hazard on six intervals: 0 till 2 months; 2 till 6
months; 6 months till 1 year; 1 till 2 years; 2 till 5 years and 5 years and beyond.12 The estimation
results are given in Table 7 in Appendix A. Big differences are visible among the ethnic groups.
From the parameters of the piecewise constant baseline hazard we can estimate the baseline
survival function, that is the survival function for the reference individual, an individual with
all covariates at zero, that is a single male with basic or no education, good health, no labour
market experience, no kids and aged 35. This baseline survival function (taking the changing
age into account) is depicted for each ethnic group in Figure 2. A native reference individual
leaves unemployment the fastest and a Turkish reference individual the slowest.
[Place Figure 2 here]
The impact of observed characteristics on the outflow into employment differs substantially
among the ethnic groups. We see from Table 7 that the relative labour market experience,
the percentage of time spent working since graduating, is the most important variable. The
more labour market experience the faster the unemployed return to work. This effect is the
highest for Turks and Antilleans. Gender plays a role for the Antilleans and natives, education
11 See UWV, http://www.uwv.nl/overuwv/kennis-publicaties/index.aspx (only in Dutch)
12Due to limited observations in particular duration intervals for some ethnic groups we had to combine the
baseline intervals for that group.
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is important for the Turks and Moroccans, marital status is important for Surinamese and
health is important for Turks. The presence of young children reduces the re-employment rate
(only significant for Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese).
To find out to what extent the model’s determinants affect the expected unemployment
duration, we applied the decomposition method explained in section 3.2. For each ethnic group
we calculate the expected unemployment duration implied by parameter estimates and compare
this expected duration with the expected duration of Dutch natives. The decomposition allows
us to calculate the portion of the difference that arises from differences in coefficients, the
portion of the difference that arises from differences in the baseline hazard and the portion of
the difference that arises from differences in explanatory variables.
Table 2: Decomposition of difference in expected UNEMPLOYMENT duration (in months)
Turks Moroccans Surinamese Antilleans
Expected duration ethnic group 41.0 39.6 17.6 19.5
Expected duration natives 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6
ethnic group- natives 36.4 35.0 13.0 14.9
Difference due to:
Explanatory variables 10.1 12.8 3.5 5.8
Coefficients 1.8 8.7 -1.4 6.0
Baseline hazard 24.5 13.6 10.9 3.1
Source: SPVA (ISEO/SCP)
The results in Table 2 show that Turks and Moroccans have far the longest expected unem-
ployment duration (more than three years) and natives far the shortest (about 41
2
months). The
difference in the expected unemployment duration is mainly attributable to the fact that the
variables in our model turn out to be unfavorable for the job chances of Turks and Moroccans.
The difference in coefficients play only a role in explaining the difference in expected duration
for Antilleans and Moroccans. The baseline duration dependence for Turks and Moroccans is
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also much worse. This implies that a Turkish or Moroccan reference individual will stay much
longer unemployed than a Dutch native reference individual.
A different baseline hazard can arise for two reasons. First, the baseline hazard is truly
different and/or, secondly, important factors that explain the unemployment duration are ne-
glected in the model. Although, we could not identify unobserved heterogeneity, it may still be
present (see Bijwaard and Ridder 2005). If the baseline hazard is truly lower for ethnic groups
this may indicate discrimination of these groups on the labour market. The same holds for the
difference in coefficients. However, we cannot rule out that important unobserved factors like
Dutch language proficiency, social aspects and cultural networks explain the differences (cf.
Veenman 1998).
4.3 From domestic care to work
Since domestic care is still predominantly a female activity, even in ‘modern’ Western societies
(Hofmeister et al. 2003), we will focus on women in this section. Looking at the labour market
participation in 2002, we find the highest rates among Surinamese females (64%), followed by
Antillean and native Dutch females (59%). A large gap exists with Mediterranean females: 32%
labour market participation among Turkish women and 30% among Moroccan women. Age
differentiation reveals participation rates during the life cycle, see Figure 3. For native Dutch
women we find a kind of inverse U-curve that is known for men, however with a decline after
the age of 30. This is the age at which native Dutch women on average give birth to their
first child. Since a slight increase in participation exists after the age of 42 we may speak of a
‘child dip’ in the participation curve, although without a return to the original high level. The
labour market participation among native Dutch females drops back strongly after the age of
48, partly because of a cohort effect since women above 60 mostly did not participate at all.
[Place Figure 3 here]
Surinamese women show a clearer inverse U-curve, although with a difficult to explain
decline in the age category 45 till 48. The labour market participation definitely diminishes
after the age of 51. Antillean women show a kind of inverse U-curve. A ‘child dip’ in the curve
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exists between the ages of 27 and 39. As among Surinamese women the participation rate clearly
diminishes after the age of 51. While Surinamese women and to a lesser degree Antillean women
are able to combine domestic care and work, we find quite different results for Mediterranean
women. They have a relatively low marriage age, have children on a relatively early age, and
show a strong decline in labour market participation after marrying and giving birth to a child.
Among Moroccan females the labour market participation remains low during their life cycle
while Turkish women show a slight increase after the first decline, followed by a second decline.
It therefore comes as no surprise that the life cycle participation rate among Mediterranean
women is much lower than among Caribbean and native Dutch women. The lower labour market
participation can be explained from more traditional gender roles. Mediterranean women are
expected to take care of the family and not (or to a lesser degree) to participate on the labour
market (Distelbrink and Pels 2002).
Table 3 presents information on the separate effects of partner and child(ren) on the labour
market participation of women between 15 and 50 years of age. Mediterranean women show
the lowest participation rates if they have both a partner and a child. Among Turkish women
the difference with having a partner or a child is rather small. Among Moroccan women we
find a stronger (negative) effect on labour market participation in case of a having a child than
of having a partner. For them marriage has less effect on participation than giving birth to a
child. Among Caribbean women we find the lowest participation rates for those with a child
and without a partner. Yet the proportion of those working (for at least 12 hours per week)
among these single mothers is nearly 60% for Surinamese females and 50% for Antillean females.
This may illustrate the general high labour market participation rate among Caribbean women.
Having a partner does not (negatively) affect the participation. Among Antillean women the
effect of having a child is much greater.
Like we did for the duration in unemployment we estimate the hazard rates for the time
spent in domestic care (in years) using the model with maximum duration for stock-sampled
data that accounts for varying entry, see Section 3.1. Very often women stay at home for a
long period. Thus the domestic care duration can easily be 20 years. This implies that many
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Table 3: Labour market participation among women (15-50 years of age) by family structure
and ethnic group
(%) Turks Moroccans Surinamese Antilleans
No partner, no child 53∗ 50 67 62
Partner, no child 29 46 72 80
Partner and child 28 22 73 61
No partner, child 30 32 59 50
(N =) 726 613 609 486
∗ less than 25 observations. Source: SPVA (ISEO/SCP)
women do not participate on the labour market till their retirement age and therefore has the
upper bound on the duration a greater impact on the estimation results. Only recently the
participation rate of women in The Netherlands increased. In the late 70s less than 20% of
the women were participating on the labour market. This implies an overrepresentation of the
women who begun their domestic care in the 70s or earlier. We adjust for this overrepresentation
by assuming that the national inflow in domestic care in the past is proportional to the number
of non-participating women 20 years of age.13 We also assume that this inflow is proportional
to the observed characteristics of the women.
We estimate a proportional hazards model with a piecewise constant baseline hazard on
four intervals: 0 till 5 years; 5 till 10 years; 10 till 20 years and 20 years and beyond.14 The
estimation results are given in Table 8 in Appendix A. Again the parameters estimates differ
among the ethnic groups. We estimate the survival rate for the reference female, that is a single
female with basic or no education, no labour market experience, no kids and aged 40. This
baseline survival function (taking the changing age into account) is depicted for each ethnic
group in Figure 4. A Dutch native (reference) female in domestic care has the slowest outflow
and an Antillean the fastest outflow into employment. Note that for all groups more than 60%
remain in domestic care for more than 25 years.
13See the public statistics site of Statistics Netherlands, http://statline.cbs.nl/ for the numbers.
14See note 12.
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[Place Figure 4 here]
The impact of observed characteristics on the re-employment rate out off domestic care
differs substantially among the ethnic groups. We see from Table 8 that the relative labour
market experience is again the most important variable. The more labour market experience
the faster the women leave domestic care and start working again. This effect is the highest
for Turkish women. Education is important for the Turkish and Moroccan women, marital
status is important for Turkish women. The presence of young children reduces the rate to
leave domestic care for Turkish and Moroccan women by more than 90%. To find out to what
extent the model’s determinants affect the expected duration of domestic care, we applied the
decomposition method explained in section 3.2.
Table 4: Decomposition of difference in expected HOUSEHOLD CARE duration (in years)
Turks Moroccans Surinamese Antilleans
Expected duration ethnic group 28.7 36.0 27.4 22.8
Expected duration natives 26.6 26.6 26.6 26.6
ethnic group- natives 2.1 9.4 0.8 -3.8
Difference due to:
Explanatory variables 13.0 18.7 7.3 8.3
Coefficients 1.1 2.9 0.3 0.7
Baseline hazard -12.0 -12.3 -6.8 -12.8
Source: SPVA (ISEO/SCP)
The results in Table 4 show that Moroccan women have the longest expected domestic care
duration (36 years) and Antillean women the shortest (23 years), which is even shorter than
the expected duration of Dutch native women (somewhat less than 27 years). The difference
in the expected domestic care duration is mainly attributable to the fact that the variables in
our model are unfavorable for the job chances of Moroccan women (and Turkish women). The
baseline hazard is for all ethnic minority women above the baseline hazard for native women,
20
which is probably due to the fact that native Dutch women, who completely stop working after
giving birth to a child, are a very specific category with rather traditional norms in relation to
gender roles. The difference in coefficients plays only a minor role in explaining the difference
in expected domestic care duration of women.
4.4 From prolonged illness to work
The last transition type to be discussed here is between prolonged illness and paid work. Mainly
because the available data confine to disability to work, we will focus on that. The SPVA-
2002 contains data on self-reported disability to work and on receiving a disability allowance.
Combining these two variables, we find highly varying proportions of disabled persons per ethnic
group see Table 5.
Table 5: Percentage disabled persons in the total population (15-65 years) and in the labour
force by ethnic group
Turks Moroccans Surinamese Antilleans Dutch
M F M F M F M F M F
Total Population 11 8 11 4 5 7 4 4 9 8
Labour force 17 25 17 12 7 11 5 6 12 14
Source: SPVA (ISEO/SCP)
When looking at the total population (15-65 years of age), we find the proportion of disabled
persons to be the highest among Mediterranean males, followed by native Dutch males. The
proportion of disabled persons among Caribbean males is much lower. Among females, the
Turks and the Dutch natives show the highest proportion of disabled persons, followed by the
Surinamese. The proportion is low among Moroccan and Antillean women. The proportion of
disabled persons in the labour force (those working for at least 12 hours per week or actively
looking for work for at least 12 hours per week) is the highest among Turkish females (25%). This
is the result of a combination of relatively many disabled persons and a relatively small labour
force. Mediterranean males too show a high proportion of disabled persons in the labour force
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(17%), followed at some distance by the native Dutch males (12%). A much lower proportion
is found among the Antilleans, males and females alike.
Again we estimate the hazard rate for the transition from disability to work (in years). To
this end, we apply the model described in section 3.1. Since the duration on disability benefits
can exceed 20 years, in the analysis of the return to work from disability the maximum duration
implied by the retirement age also plays an important role. As the inflow into disability has
changed over time, we use the national inflow figures to adjust for the changing inflow in the
past.15 We assume a piecewise constant baseline hazard on five intervals: 0 till 5 years; 5 till
10 years; 10 till 15 years; 15 till 20 years and 20 years and beyond.16 The estimated survival
functions for the reference individual, a single male with no high education, no labour market
experience aged 48, are depicted in Figure 5. Note the drop to zero in the baseline survival
functions after 17 years in disability, when the retirement age of 65 is reached. An Antillean
(reference) individual in disability has the fastest outflow into employment. Turks, Moroccans
and Surinamese have the first 10 years of disability a very low rate of leaving disability.
[Place Figure 5 here]
The estimation results in Table 9 (appendx A) indicate that the impact of observed char-
acteristics on the re-employment rate differ substantially among the ethnic groups. Again the
relative labour market experience is the most important variable. However, due to limited ob-
servations the impact of this variable for Dutch natives had to be fixed to zero. For the ethnic
minorities the more labour market experience the faster they leave disability and return to
work. Education is only important for natives and gender is important for Turks. We applied
the decomposition method again to disentangle the affect of the model’s determinants on the
expected disability duration.
The results in Table 6 show that Moroccans have the longest expected disability dura-
tion (18 years) and Antilleans the shortest (5 years). This is a surprisingly short period when
compared to the expected disability duration of Dutch natives (13 years). The high expected
15See note 11
16See note 12.
22
Table 6: Decomposition of difference in expected DISABILITY duration (in years)
Turks Moroccans Surinamese Antilleans
Expected duration ethnic group 14.6 17.8 14.3 4.6
Expected duration natives 13.4 13.4 13.4 13.4
ethnic group- natives 1.2 4.4 0.9 -8.8
Difference due to:
Explanatory variables 4.7 4.7 4.2 2.1
Coefficients -8.6 -5.8 -9.1 0.2
Baseline hazard 5.0 5.5 5.8 -11.1
Source: SPVA (ISEO/SCP)
disability durations are attributable to the fact that the variables in the model turn out to
be unfavorable for the groups concerned. The differences in the baseline duration dependence
(5 to 6 years) add to the long expected duration for Moroccans, Turks and Surinamese. The
difference in coefficients, on the other hand, lead to a shorter expected disability duration for
these groups compared to the Dutch natives. The Antilleans show a much shorter expected
disability duration, mainly due to a better baseline hazard.
5 Summary and conclusions
According to the German economist Gu¨nther Schmid, contemporary labour markets are char-
acterized by such a high degree of flexibility that a new type of labour market is emergent.
This so-called transitional labour market offers new chances for employers and employees alike,
but at the same time increases the risk of ‘exclusionary transitions’. To diminish this risk,
Schmid pleads for institutional arrangements that further maintenance and integrative transi-
tions. In Schmid’s view, the Netherlands offer a good example of a labour market with such
arrangements.
We investigated whether the emergent transitional labour market in the Netherlands im-
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plies higher risks of ‘exclusionary’ transitions for groups which, for human capital reasons, are
already vulnerable on the labour market. We therefore compared immigrants to Dutch na-
tives, and subsequently elaborated on the transitions from (a) education, (b) unemployment,
(c) domestic care, and (d) prolonged illness to work. We used duration analysis to estimate
different groups’ chances to make a transition from inactivity to work. Such analysis was not
possible for the transition from education to work, however, as we lack data on the duration
of unemployment among school leavers. In this case we looked at differences in unemployment
rate among youngsters with identical educational achievements, belonging to various ethnic
groups. We found that immigrant youth have higher transitional risks than their native Dutch
contemporaries. This is especially the case for Turkish and Moroccan youngsters. The higher
risks are explained from lower language proficiency, less knowledge of the labour market, less
useful social contacts, as well as from selection processes on the Dutch labour market which
are detrimental to immigrants.
To investigate the other transition types, we used proportional hazards models with max-
imum duration for stock-sampled data that account for varying entry, and piecewise constant
baseline hazards on different intervals (calculated in months for unemployment and in years for
both domestic care and prolonged illness). Looking at the baseline survival function, we find
that in the case of unemployment the native Dutch reference individual leaves unemployment
the fastest. Turks and Moroccans leave unemployment the slowest, while the Surinamese and
Antilleans are in-between as in the case of the transition from education. The analysis of the
transition from domestic care to work, which is restricted to women, establishes that the native
reference female has the slowest outflow. Surinamese and in particular Antillean women clearly
have faster outflows, while the Turkish and Moroccan females compare more to native women.
We explained this somewhat remarkable outcome from the traditional attitude among the spe-
cific category of native women who completely stop working after giving birth to a child. In the
case of disability to work, the transition to the labour market is the fastest for the Antillean
reference individual. More generally, Antilleans diverge remarkably from all other groups that
show very low outflow, especially in the first ten years of disability.
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Our analyses show that unequal chances exist, but to a different degree for the various
groups and with variations per transition type. To try and explain the differences found, we
used decomposition analyses on the expected durations estimated by the proportional hazards
model. Again, it is difficult to formulate general findings. In the case of unemployment, we
first established that the impact of the observed characteristics on the outflow differs greatly
among the various groups. We then showed that the higher transitional risks for the Turks
and Moroccans are mainly attributable to the fact that the observed characteristics turn out
to be unfavorable for them. These characteristics concern both endowments and demographic
features, such as marital status, gender and age. Since their baseline duration dependence is also
much worse, we should take into consideration that discrimination may play a role alongside
other unobserved factors such as language proficiency, social networks and cultural aspects (e.g.
work attitude, search behaviour).
In the case of domestic care, we again found large differences in the impact of the observed
characteristics on the transitional risks of the ethnic groups. The decomposition of the expected
home care durations shows that the observed characteristics are unfavorable for Moroccan and
Turkish women. The difference in coefficients plays only a minor role in the explanation of
the expected outflow. The disadvantageous baseline hazard for the specific category of native
Dutch women, who completely stopped working after giving birth to a child, is explained from
their traditional attitude towards gender roles.
Also in the case of disability, the impact of the observed characteristics differs substantially
among the various groups. While the Antilleans, characterized by a fast outflow, show an
advantageous baseline hazard, the low outflow of Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese seems
to be related to the observed characteristics as well as to the difference in baseline duration
dependence. This may be due to the same factors mentioned in the case of unemployment. It
may however also be a consequence of miscommunication with civil servants from the agency
responsible for the disability benefits (Veenman 2006). Such factors seem to be highly relevant,
given the fact that the differences in coefficients lead to a shorter expected disability duration
for the Turks, Moroccans, and Surinamese compared to the Dutch natives.
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The short discussion of the results from the decomposition analyses confirms that it is not
easy to formulate general findings. The only factor with significant meaning in every analysis
is the relative labour market experience, i.e. the percentage of time spent working since leaving
education. The longer the period of labour market participation, the faster the return to work
for those who at the moment are unemployed, take care of children or are disabled. If the
duration of work experience is of such importance, it means that rapid transitions back-to-
work are a strong remedy against ’exclusionary’ transitions. This somewhat circular reasoning
underlines the importance of the institutional arrangements Schmid pleaded for. Without such
arrangements the transitional labour market might be very risky for groups that are already
vulnerable for human capital reasons.
References
Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society, Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage.
Bijwaard, G. E. and G. Ridder (2005). Correcting for selective compliance in a re–employment
bonus experiment. Journal of Econometrics 125, 77–111.
Blinder, A. S. (1973). Wage discrimination: Reduced form and structural estimates. Journal
of Human Resources 8, 436–455.
Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J. G. Richardson (Ed.), Handbook of Theory
and Research for the Sociology of Education, pp. 241–258. New York: Greenwood Press.
Bovenkerk, F., M. J. I. Gras, and D. Ramsoedh (1995). Discrimination against migrant work-
ers and ethnic minorities in access to employment in the Netherlands. International Mi-
gration Papers 4, Employment Department, International Labour Office (ILO), Geneva.
Dagevos, J. (2001). Perspectief op integratie (‘Perspective of integration’). WRR-report,
Scientific Council for Government Policy, The Hague.
de Koning, J., G. E. Bijwaard, A. Gelderblom, and H. Kroes (2003). Arbeidsmarkttransities
en aanboddiscrepanties (‘Labour market transitions and supply discrepancies’). OSA-
publicatie A191, Tilburg.
Dewey, J. (1990). The school and society and the child and the curriculum. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Dieleman, A. J. and J. van der Lans (1999). Heft in eigen handen, Zelfsturing en sociale be-
trokkenheid bij jongeren (’Do it on your own, Self-activity and social commitment among
youngsters’). Assen: Van Gorcum.
26
Distelbrink, M. and T. Pels (2002). Normatieve orie¨ntaties en binding (’Normative orienta-
tions and bonding’). In J. Veenman (Ed.), De toekomst in meervoud, pp. 115–145. Assen:
Van Gorcum.
Fairlie, R. W. (2006). An extension of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique to logit
and probit models. Discussion Paper 1917, IZA, Bonn.
Geelhoed, L. (1997). Flexibilisering van de arbeid, deregulering en marktwerking (’Labour
market flexibilisation, de-regulation and markets’). In G. Faber and J. Schippers (Eds.),
Flexibilisering van arbeid, pp. 29–40. Bussum: Coutinho.
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity, Self and society in the late modern-age.
Cambridge (UK): Polity Press.
Groeneveld, S. M. and Y. M. R. Weijers-Martens (2003). Minderheden in beeld, De SPVA-02
(’A portrait of ethnic minoirities, The SPVA-2002’). Rotterdam: Institute for Sociological
and Economic Research.
Ham, J. C., J. Svejnar, and K. Terrel (1998). Unemployment and the socail safety net dur-
ing transitions to a market economy: Evidence from the Czech and Slovak Republics.
American Economic Review 88, 1117–1142.
Heckman, J. J. and B. Singer (1984). Econometric duration analysis. Journal of Economet-
rics 24, 63–132.
Hofmeister, H., M. Mills, and H. P. Blossfeld (2003). Globalization, uncertainty, and women’s
mid-career life courses, A theoretical framework. Globalife Working paper 45, Faculty of
Social and Economic Science, Bamberg.
Murphy, A. (1996). A piecewise–constant hazard-rate model for the duration of unemploy-
ment in single-interview samples of the stock of unemployed. Economics Letters 51, 177–
183.
Nickell, S. (1979). Estimating the probability of leaving unemployment. Econometrica 47,
1249–1266.
Oaxaca, R. L. (1973). Male–female wage differentials in urban labor markets. International
Economic Review 14, 693–709.
Roelandt, T. and J. Veenman (1990). Allochtonen van school naar werk (’Allochthones from
school to work’). WRR-report 67, Scientific Council for Government Policy, The Hague.
Schmid, G. (1997). The Dutch employment miracle?, A comparison of employment systems
in the Netherlands and Germany. Discussion paper FS I 97-202, Wissenschaftszentrum
Berlin fu¨r Sozialforschung, Berlin.
Schmid, G. (1998). Transitional labour markets, A new European employment strategy. Dis-
cussion paper FS I 98-206, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fu¨r Sozialforschung, Berlin.
Schmid, G. (2000). Foreword. In J. O’Reilly, I. Cebrian, and M. Lallement (Eds.), Working-
time Changes: Social Integration through Transitional Labour Markets, pp. xix–xxi. Chel-
tenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
27
Schmid, G. (2001). Die Zukunft der Erwerbsarbeit, Thesen und Perspektiven fu¨ Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern. Diskussionsbeitra¨ge Schwerin -Schloss Schwerin.
Schmid, G. (2002a). Employment systems in transition: Explaining performance differen-
tials of post-industrial economies. In G. Schmid and B. Glazier (Eds.), The Dynamics
of Full Employment, Social Integration through Transitional Labour Markets, pp. 23–48.
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Schmid, G. (2002b). Towards a theory of transitional labour markets. In G. Schmid and
B. Glazier (Eds.), The Dynamics of Full Employment, Social Integration through Transi-
tional Labour Markets, pp. 151–195. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Veenman, J. (1998). Buitenspel, Over langdurige werkloosheid onder etnische minderheden
(’Off-side, Long-term unemployed ethnic minorities’). Assen: Van Gorcum.
Veenman, J. (Ed.) (2006). Nieuwe ongelijkheden op de transitionele arbeidsmarkt (’New in-
equalities on the transitional labour market’), Amsterdam. Aksant.
Wilthagen, T. (1998). Flexicurity, A new paradigm for labour market policy reform? Discus-
sion paper FS I 98-202, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fu¨r Sozialforschung, Berlin.
A Estimation results
28
Table 7: Parameter estimates of hazard model with maximum duration for time in UNEM-
PLOYMENT (in months)
Turks Moroccans Surinamese Antilleans Natives
Regression coefficients
Female 0.024 0.057 −0.047 −0.574∗∗ −0.269∗
(0.111) (0.148) (0.094) (0.164) (0.125)
Married/Cohabiting 0.171 −0.008 0.258∗ 0.182 0.029
(0.109) (0.121) (0.118) (0.190) (0.124)
Low Secondary educ. 0.408∗∗ 0.591∗∗ 0.115 0.055 −
(0.149) (0.154) (0.133) (0.204)
High Secondary educ. 0.211 0.551∗∗ −0.055 0.230 0.104
(0.185) (0.208) (0.134) (0.205) (0.145)
High education 0.021 0.107 −0.201 −0.410 0.133
(0.357) (0.309) (0.185) (0.250) (0.153)
Relative labour experience 1.113∗∗ 0.798∗∗ 0.826∗∗ 1.130∗∗ 0.600∗
(0.247) (0.225) (0.178) (0.295) (0.235)
bad health −0.383∗ −0.314 −0.052 −0.200 0.264
(0.169) (0.185) (0.178) (0.294) (0.147)
agea −0.118 0.083 −0.065 0.065 −0.061
(0.089) (0.100) (0.061) (0.101) (0.075)
age-squared −0.131∗ −0.269∗∗ 0.009 −0.126 −0.008
(0.061) (0.076) (0.045) (0.075) (0.056)
Children (< 12) −0.640∗∗ −0.590∗∗ −0.381∗∗ −0.055 −0.045
(0.160) (0.149) (0.137) (0.180) (0.155)
duration dependenceb
α1 (0 to 2 months) −2.913 −2.254 −2.758 −2.071 −0.536
(0.527) (0.427) (0.282) (0.370) (0.394)
α2 (2 to 6 months) −2.913 −2.254 −2.758 −2.071 −1.861
(0.527) (0.427) (0.282) (0.370) (0.481)
α3 (6 month to 1 year) −3.868 −2.907 −2.758 −2.810 −3.654
(0.412) (0.613) (0.282) (0.333) (0.303)
α4 (1 to 2 years) −3.868 −3.968 −2.713 −2.810 −3.654
(0.412) (0.240) (0.284) (0.333) (0.303)
α5 (2 to 5 years) −3.884 −3.968 −4.017 −3.658 −3.654
(0.254) (0.240) (0.369) (0.411) (0.303)
α6 (> 5 years ) −4.172 −4.071 −4.270 −3.593 −4.596
(0.151) (0.165) (0.177) (0.238) (0.264)
Log-likelihood −2192.3 −1857.2 −1193.0 −659.4 −465.6
N 414 343 247 142 103
a Age is the (time-varying) age at each year of unemployment, starting from the year the individ-
ual entered unemployment, centered at the mean age of 35 years. b The duration dependence
is piecewise constant with parameter eαi , for i = 1, . . . 6. Some intervals are combined. Turks: 1
and 2, 3 and 4; Moroccans: 1 and 2, 4 and 5; Surinamese: 1, 2 and 3; Antilleans: 1 and 2, 3 and
4; Natives: 3, 4 and 5. Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05;∗∗ p < 0.01
(only for regression coefficients). Source: SPVA (ISEO/SCP)
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Table 8: Parameter estimates of hazard model with maximum duration for time in DOMESTIC
CARE (in years) for women
Turks Moroccans Surinamese Antilleans Natives
Regression coefficients
Married/Cohabiting 0.647∗∗ −0.421 −0.070 −0.417 −0.268
(0.173) (0.557) (0.304) (0.246) (0.368)
Low Secondary educ. 0.647∗∗ 1.597∗ − 0.631 −
(0.251) (0.685) (0.412)
High Secondary educ. 0.762∗ 2.344∗∗ − 0.600 −
(0.346) (0.722) (0.470)
High education −0.100 1.800 − 0.849 0.183
(0.866) (1.251) (0.649) (0.376)
Relative labour experience 4.065∗∗ 3.406∗∗ 3.344∗∗ 1.391∗∗ 3.418∗∗
(0.594) (1.064) (0.653) (0.395) (0.635)
agea 0.365 0.137 −0.046 −0.702 0.457
(0.339) (0.722) (0.254) (0.419) (0.270)
age-squared −1.355∗ −1.634∗ −0.605∗ −1.144∗∗ −0.415
(0.617) (0.659) (0.261) (0.374) (0.270)
Children (< 12) −2.764∗∗ −2.382∗∗ −0.107 0.487 0.286
(0.995) (0.626) (0.415) (0.344) (0.394)
duration dependenceb
α1 (0 to 5 years) −3.919 −3.478 −3.267 −2.318 −4.161
(0.444) (0.832) (0.556) (0.512) (0.590)
α2 (5 to 10 years) −3.919 −3.478 −3.066 −2.318 −4.161
(0.444) (0.832) (0.583) (0.512) (0.590)
α3 (10 to 20 years) −2.850 −2.888 −4.684 −4.308 −5.974
(0.402) (0.285) (0.512) (0.504) (0.816)
α4 (> 20 years) −3.122 −2.888 −4.684 −4.308 −5.974
(0.204) (0.285) (0.512) (0.504) (0.816)
Log-likelihood −4615.447 −4143.754 −1481.672 −1070.293 −1211.743
N 1268 1098 418 306 345
a Age is the (time-varying) age at each year of unemployment, starting from the year the individ-
ual entered unemployment, centered at the mean age of 40 years. b The duration dependence is
piecewise constant with parameter eαi , for i = 1, . . . 4. Some intervals are combined. Turks: 1 and 2;
Moroccans: 1 and 2, 3 and 4; Surinamese: 3 and 4; Antilleans: 1 and 2, 3 and 4; Natives: 1 and 2, 3
and 4. Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05;∗∗ p < 0.01 (only for regression
coefficients). Source: SPVA (ISEO/SCP)
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Table 9: Parameter estimates of hazard model with maximum duration for time in DISABIL-
ITY (in years)
Turks Moroccans Surinamese Antilleans Natives
Regression coefficients
Female 0.869∗∗ 0.943 0.507 0.129 −
(0.244) (0.487) (0.288) (0.293)
married/cohabiting 0.139 −0.635 0.431 − 0.512
(0.214) (0.479) (0.270) (0.494)
High education − − − − 1.200∗
(0.513)
Relative labour experience 3.036∗∗ 3.504∗∗ 2.621∗∗ 0.082 −
(0.488) (0.984) (0.511) (0.418)
agea 0.228 0.223 0.687∗∗ 0.001 −
(0.184) (0.300) (0.194) (0.335)
age-squared −0.029 −0.201 0.221 0.111 −
(0.125) (0.286) (0.160) (0.172)
duration dependenceb
α1 (0 to 5 years) -4.529 -6.655 -4.510 -1.544 -3.414
(0.617) (1.027) (0.512) (0.527) (0.448)
α2 (5 to 10 years) -4.742 -4.313 -4.510 -2.725 -3.414
(0.602) (0.592) (0.512) (0.466) (0.448)
α3 (10 to 15 years) -4.694 -5.357 -4.510 -2.725 -3.414
(0.795) (1.093) (0.512) (0.466) (0.448)
α4 (15 to 20 years) -3.976 -5.357 -3.900 -2.725 -3.414
(0.615) (1.093) (0.468) (0.466) (0.448)
α5 (> 20 years) -2.810 -2.099 -3.900 -3.278 -3.618
(0.387) (0.529) (0.468) (1.367) (0.961)
Log-likelihood -1544.9 -1205.6 -794.5 -244.1 -368.7
N 508 397 268 84 117
a Age is the (time-varying) age at each year of unemployment, starting from the year the indi-
vidual entered disability, centered at the mean age of 48 years. b The duration dependence
is piecewise constant with parameter eαi , for i = 1, . . . 5 on the intervals: 0 to 5 years, 5 to 10
years, 10 to 15 years, 15 to 20 years and 20 years and beyond. Some intervals are combined.
Moroccans: 3 and 4; Surinamese: 1, 2 and 3, 4 and 5; Antilleans: 2, 3 and 4; Natives: 1 to 4.
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05;∗∗ p < 0.01 (only for regression
coefficients). Source: SPVA (ISEO/SCP)
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B Figures
Figure 1: Forms of labour market transitions within the TLM-approach.
Source: Schmid, 1998:12
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Figure 2: Estimated survival rate in UNEMPLOYMENT for a reference individual.
A reference individual is a single male with basic or no education, good health, no labour market
experience, no kids and aged 35.
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Figure 3: labour participation of women by ethnic group and age, 2002.
Source: SPVA (ISEO/SCP)
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Figure 4: Estimated survival rate in DOMESTIC CARE for a reference female.
A reference female is a single female with basic or no education, no labour market experience, no kids
and aged 40.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
years since start disability benefits
Turks
Moroccans
Surinamese
Antilleans
Natives
Figure 5: Estimated survival rate in DISABILITY for a reference individual.
A reference individual is a single male with no high education, no labour market experience, no kids
and aged 48.
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